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Ross et al. v. American Express et al.
The Story Behind the Spread of Class Action-Barring 
Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements
Nancy A. Welsh and Stephen J. Ware
A recent case from the Southern District of New York, Ross et al v. American Express et al, is an antitrust case, but it also is an important case for arbitration. 
Ross consolidated several class actions in which plaintiffs 
alleged that major credit card issuing banks, including 
American Express (Amex), First USA, Bank of America, 
Citibank, Chase, Discover, and others “violated the 
Sherman Act by agreeing with their competitors to imple-
ment and maintain mandatory class action-barring arbitra-
tion clauses as a term or condition for holding their general 
purpose credit cards.”1
Several defendants settled, but Judge William H. Pauley 
III conducted a bench trial for the remainder. He ruled in 
favor of the remaining defendants, finding that a conspiracy 
in violation of the Sherman Act “requires proof of joint or 
concerted action as opposed to unilateral action”2 and that 
plaintiffs did not sustain their burden of proof. In May 2014, 
the plaintiffs filed an appeal in the Second Circuit.
Judge Pauley’s 90-plus page opinion details four years of 
activity among the credit card issuers, including their par-
ticipation in 28 organizational meetings, email exchanges, 
telephone calls, in-person conversations, and other events 
in which representatives discussed the benefits of class 
action-barring arbitration clauses, public relations, pending 
litigation, and clauses likely to survive judicial review. 
Before this series of meetings and communications, two 
of the defendant banks had adopted class action-barring 
arbitration clauses. By the time the meetings ended, all  
the defendant banks had adopted such clauses, with 
approximately 87% of all general-purpose credit card  
transactions subject to both arbitration and a prohibition 
against class action.3
According to Judge Pauley’s opinion, First USA, which 
implemented a credit card arbitration clause in 1998 
(becoming the first defendant bank to do so), hired “an out-
spoken advocate against class action lawsuits” as its “arbi-
tration consultant” and assigned him to “create some sort of 
forum to talk about arbitration issues.”4 About 18 months 
later, Amex adopted its own credit card arbitration clause, 
reasoning that it “would benefit Amex by lowering litigation 
costs in the short term and [avoiding] very expensive class 
action suits in the medium to longer term.”5
During this time period, partners at two law firms began 
working with First USA and Amex to hold meetings 
with other banks’ senior in-house credit card counsel. 
The partners’ goal was to “show [their] stuff” on “issues 
of common concern,” including arbitration and later, 
to “round up other businesses that might want to join a 
coalition to defend and foster arbitration.” 6 Meetings of 
the “Arbitration Coalition” grew to include a “phalanx”7 of 
lawyers from top firms as well as representatives from vari-
ous banks, consumer lenders, trade associations, and public 
relations firms.8
The attendees apparently agreed to share arbitration-
related thoughts and materials, including FAQ responses, 
customer identification materials, legal briefs, arbitration 
clauses, and change-in-terms notices.9 The organizers also 
sought contributions from the participants to fund amicus 
briefs filed in arbitration matters pending before the US 
Supreme Court.10 The Arbitration Coalition spawned two 
other groups – the “Consumer Companies Class Action 
Working Group” and the “In-House Working Group,” 
which consisted entirely of in-house counsel and met sev-
eral times by teleconference. On an ad hoc basis, in-house 
counsel also questioned each other about arbitration clause 
adoptions. Occasionally, dispute resolution organizations 
were involved.
From these and other facts, Judge Pauley concluded that 
the banks had reached “an agreement to explore collective 
advocacy efforts aimed at expanding the enforceability of 
arbitration clauses and to establish class action-barring 
arbitration as an industry norm.”11 Indeed, he observed that 
“[d]irect evidence of this agreement abounds in meeting 
agendas, solicitations to fund amicus briefs and research, 
and willingness to explore joint action such as the FAQs 
project or self-regulation efforts.”12 Arbitration clauses were 
“not salient” (i.e., “visible or meaningful”) to consumers 
during the relevant period,13 and Judge Pauley concluded 
the banks had “a motive to conspire in the adoption of 
arbitration clauses”14 because “collusion would ensure that 
no Issuing Bank facilitated a rise to salience before arbitra-
tion was firmly entrenched as the industry norm. Collusion 
would also help to ensure that each bank’s clause was [of] 
sufficient quality [to] withstand legal challenges that could 
undermine the enforceability of every bank’s clause.”15
Judge Pauley examined the concept of salience, observ-
ing that late fees, over-the-limit fees, and foreign currency 
exchange fees in the credit card and banking industries 
became salient only when issuers began offering credit 
cards that did not include such fees. Thus, competitors 
forced “obscure terms to salience in order to distinguish and 
market their products.” Judge Pauley also highlighted con-
sumers’ ability to learn about such terms through personal 
experience, the experience of other consumers, and advice 
from consumer groups and advocates that “facilitate[s] a 
term’s rise to salience…..”16
Despite these observations, however, Judge Pauley con-
cluded that no conspiracy or other antitrust violation was 
necessary to induce each bank to adopt arbitration clauses 
because “avoiding class actions through arbitration was in 
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each Issuing Bank’s independent self[-]interest, regardless 
of whether its competitors also adopted such a provision. 
... Unlike some other cost-saving measures, the benefit 
of arbitration – avoiding class action litigation – was not 
diminished if competitors were in on the secret.”17 He added 
that “[w]hile the tenor of the meetings was heavily slanted 
in favor of arbitration, the record indicates that the final 
decision to adopt class-action-barring arbitration clauses 
was something the Issuing Banks hashed out individually 
and internally. … While there is evidence the Issuing Banks 
tried to determine their competitors’ plans and experiences 
regarding arbitration, as would be expected in an oligopoly, 
this Court does not discern any concerted action arising 
from those inquiries.”18
Judge Pauley described the evidence as “ambiguous” –  
permitting an inference of illegality but also with “infer-
ences of legitimate activity” that were “just as persua-
sive.”19 “While the collusive adoption and maintenance 
of arbitration clauses would have entrenched arbitration 
as an industry standard, this Court is convinced that the 
evidence is just as consistent with legitimate activity in 
furtherance of the Issuing Banks’ independent self[-]
interests.”20 The banks did not need to conspire to “be 
motivated to cooperate on efforts to sway public opinion 
and defend the legality of their clauses in the courts and 
legislatures. Perceiving that class action attorneys would 
lobby and litigate to undermine the enforceability of 
arbitration clauses, the Issuing Banks networked to thwart 
the plaintiffs’ bar. When the motive to cooperate is just 
as consistent with legitimate goals as non-legitimate goals, 
there can be no fair inference of collusion.”21
Ultimately, Judge Pauley issued cautionary words about 
the role of outside counsel and the credit card issuers’ cost-
benefit analysis:
When outside counsel convene meetings of com-
petitors in the hope of propelling themselves to 
the forefront of an emerging trend – in this case, 
class-action-barring consumer arbitration agree-
ments – they do so at their professional peril. … It 
was only by a slender reed that Plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate that the lawyers who organized these 
meetings had spawned a Sherman Act conspiracy 
among their clients.
In retrospect, the Issuing Banks’ short-term 
goal of lowering litigation costs eluded them. 
Undoubtedly, retaining some of the most esteemed 
antitrust lawyers in the nation to counter the 
extraordinary talents of Plaintiffs’ counsel imposed 
a significant burden on the Issuing Banks. Only 
the passage of time will reveal whether the Issuing 
Banks’ longer-term goal of avoiding the expense of 
class action lawsuits can be achieved.22
Although Ross is an antitrust case, both of us believe it 
may inform policy debates about consumer arbitration. We 
disagree, however, on some of the ruling’s other implica-
tions. One of us, Ware, believes Ross shows that at least 
some very knowledgeable and sophisticated lawyers and 
businesspeople think enforcement of consumers’ arbitration 
agreements saves so much money that it is worth their while 
to go to great lengths to get it. For Ware, an important 
policy question is whether enough of these cost-savings are 
passed on to consumers to more than offset any negatives 
consumers experience from such enforcement. For Welsh, 
Ross challenges consumer advocates, agencies, and busi-
nesses to educate consumers about – and make salient – the 
value of “regular people’s” continued access to our public 
courts; Ross also challenges the dispute resolution field (and 
individual service providers) to involve both consumer and 
business interests as we seek the appropriate institutionaliza-
tion of consumer arbitration and other processes. u
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